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98 N.C. L. REV. 191 (2019) 
To Abstain, or Not To Abstain, That Is the Question: The Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits’ Divergent Approaches to Younger Abstention* 
Federal abstention is a judicially created doctrine by which a federal court declines to 
exercise its jurisdiction over a case and controversy properly before it. Abstention is 
aimed at preserving the balance of sovereignty allocated to the states and federal 
government as envisioned by the Framers. Of the various iterations of abstention, 
Younger abstention perhaps does the most to protect this balance. Despite its importance 
in maintaining principles of federalism, lower courts have struggled to come up with a 
consistent approach to Younger. This Recent Development highlights two U.S. Circuit 
Courts—the Seventh and Ninth—and their divergent approaches to Younger 
abstention and proposes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is correct as it effectively 
advances the principles of federalism and comity that Younger abstention was designed 
to protect in the first place. 
 
What happens when a court declines to exercise the jurisdiction it has been 
mandated1 to exercise? Congress gave the federal judiciary the power to 
adjudicate state-law claims when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 
and the dispute is between parties who are domiciled—at “home”2—in different 
states.3 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires that any claims “arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” are properly filed in federal 
district court.4 These statutes clearly establish when a federal court is granted 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy. However, courts are permitted to, and 
in some cases must, decline jurisdiction pursuant to the judicially created 
doctrine of abstention.5 
Abstention may not be as well known as other judicially created doctrines 
like judicial review6 or Erie,7 but it is certainly no less important and thus 
requires consistent application among lower courts in the federal judiciary. The 
 
 *  © 2019 Jessica O’Brien. 
 1. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We [the courts] have no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). 
 2. Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012). 
 4. See id. § 1331. 
 5. The doctrine of abstention, which has undergone many iterations, allows a federal court to 
decline to hear a case within its jurisdiction. James Bedell, Note, Clearing the Judicial Fog: Codifying 
Abstention, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 945 (2018). 
 6. The doctrine of judicial review is typically covered in a basic constitutional law class through 
study of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 7. First-year law students study the Erie doctrine, derived from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), in a basic civil procedure class. 
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doctrine’s importance is rooted in its aim “to preserve the balance between state 
and federal sovereignty,”8 which is one of the guiding principles of our federal 
republic.9 Without the ability to abstain, federal courts would be required to act 
as a “quasi-foreign power,” interfering in state-law issues and likely causing 
unnecessary tension between the state and federal governments.10  
The Supreme Court first established abstention in Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Pullman Co.11 to further solidify the Court’s routine policy to decide 
cases on narrow grounds and avoid making “unnecessary constitutional 
decisions.”12 Once an abstention doctrine is invoked by a federal court, litigation 
proceedings in the federal court are often paused or dismissed altogether.13 
Plaintiffs are thus tasked with navigating the procedures, rules, and costs of not 
one but two court systems. Because abstention orders are immediately 
appealable, plaintiffs must bear the costs of the appeals process in federal court 
and then again in state court if their appeal is unsuccessful.14 While abstention 
may have furthered the balance between federal and state sovereignty,15 specific 
forms of abstention provide unclear guidance as to when courts should decline 
to exercise jurisdiction. As a result, lower courts are increasingly split in their 
applications of the doctrines.16 
One such split in the circuit courts concerns Younger abstention. In 
particular, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits diverge.17 Younger abstention is a 
form of abstention by which a federal court declines to exercise its jurisdiction 
 
 8. Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1102 (1998). 
 9. Federalism serves as the primary justification for abstention. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 
236 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 10. See Drew Alan Hillier, Note, The Necessity of an Equity and Comity Analysis in Younger 
Abstention Doctrine, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2014) (“When a federal court invalidates a state law, 
the state’s citizens and government officials might bristle at the federal court’s interference. To the 
state legislator, the federal court represents a quasi-foreign power that need not have earned the 
approval of the state legislature, executive, or judiciary. The abstention doctrines also help federal 
courts to avoid erroneous interpretations of state law and unnecessary constitutional rulings.”). 
 11. 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see id. at 501 (“This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts 
in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority . . . .”). 
 12. Thomas G. Buchanan, Note, Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the Boundaries, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 
1243, 1243 (1986). 
 13. See Staver, supra note 8, at 1102; see also Bedell, supra note 5, at 952, 957–58 (explaining that 
some forms of abstention require a full dismissal of the case from federal courts, while others require 
only a stay in the federal court proceedings while the state issues are handled in state court). 
 14. See Bedell, supra note 5, at 957–58. 
 15. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 16. For example, there is no clear answer as to whether abstention is mandatory or permissive. 
See Bedell, supra note 5, at 960. Furthermore, the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all 
adhere to one test in determining when Pullman abstention is appropriate, while the Fifth Circuit 
adheres to a different test. See id. at 960–61. 
 17. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
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to further the “principles of comity and federalism.”18 The Seventh Circuit’s 
November 2018 decision in Courthouse News Service v. Brown,19 created a split 
with the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Courthouse News Service v. Planet.20 
Both cases dealt with an allegation that state court filing procedures abridged 
the First Amendment rights of the Courthouse News Service (“CNS”) 
organization, specifically the right of public access to judicial proceedings.21 The 
Ninth Circuit opted not to abstain because the plaintiff’s claims “raise[d] novel 
and important First Amendment questions that the federal courts ought to 
decide.”22 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, opted to abstain because 
“considerations of equity, comity, and federalism” mandated abstention.23 This 
Recent Development will analyze the split between the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits; explain how the two circuits came to opposite conclusions on a nearly 
identical issue; and argue the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied Younger 
abstention, thus creating needless confusion within its own circuit and severely 
undermining the original purpose of Younger abstention—the preservation of 
comity and federalism. 
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I delves into the abstention doctrines 
applied in both Planet and Brown and explains how each court reached its 
decision. Part II provides analysis as to why the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Brown was the correct decision and how the Ninth Circuit seemingly ignored 
the purpose of Younger abstention in its improper application of the doctrine. 
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of this circuit split and considers the 
future of Younger abstention. 
I.  THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE 
Federal abstention is the doctrinal mechanism by which federal courts 
decline to exercise constitutional or statutory jurisdiction24 in deference to state 
 
 18. George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide—Rethinking Younger 
Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 115–16 (1990) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 
592, 602 (1975)). The exact definition of comity is hard to pin down, see Thomas Schultz & Niccolò 
Ridi, Comity in US Courts, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 280, 285–88 (2018), but generally it “encompasses the 
notion that, based on judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and 
effect to the laws and judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction,” Staver, supra note 8, at 1116 
n.84 (citing Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930)). 
 19. 908 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No. 18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 
2019). 
 20. 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 21. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1065; Planet, 750 F.3d at 779. 
 22. Planet, 750 F.3d at 793. 
 23. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1075. 
 24. See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention 
Doctrines Will Always Be With Us—Get Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2003). 
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court proceedings.25 The circumstances in which the need for such deference 
arise are incredibly limited.26 Abstention is typically regarded as “the exception, 
not the rule.”27 Despite the infrequency with which abstention is applied, there 
are at least four clearly identifiable abstention doctrines.28 While each doctrine 
applies in distinct circumstances, all types of abstention are justified by the same 
general idea: federalism.29 Federalism—the sharing of authority over one 
geographical area by multiple, coequal, governmental units30—serves as the 
primary justification for all variations of abstention, but perhaps none more so 
than Younger abstention. 
Younger abstention ensures that federal courts “refrain from hearing 
constitutional challenges to state actions under . . . circumstances in which 
federal action is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right of a state to 
enforce its laws in its own courts.”31 The doctrine originated in Younger v. 
Harris32 in which the Supreme Court reversed an order by a federal district 
court enjoining the California Attorney General from criminally prosecuting 
the respondent under a California state law that was “void for vagueness and 
overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”33 The 
Court’s decision focused primarily on policy concerns, namely Congress’s 
“desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal 
courts”;34 notions of comity, which recognize “proper respect for state 
 
 25. Marie R. Yeates, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 1:65, at 86 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2016). 
 26. Indeed, “federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon 
them by Congress.” Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). 
 27. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). Federal 
courts are typically regarded as having a “duty . . . to adjudicate a controversy properly before [them].” 
Id. (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)). 
 28. Birdsong, supra note 24, at 377. The other three clearly identifiable abstention doctrines—not 
relevant to this Recent Development—are Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and Colorado River 
abstention. See generally Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943); R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman abstention is appropriate 
when “state action is being challenged in federal court as contrary to the . . . Constitution, and there 
are questions of state law that may be dispositive of the case.” CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY 
KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 292 (8th ed. 2017). Burford abstention is ordered, and the 
case dismissed from the federal docket, when trying to “avoid needless conflict with the administration 
by a state of its own affairs.” Id. at 296. Colorado River abstention is utilized to “address specific 
situations involving parallel litigation” in state courts. Bedell, supra note 5, at 955. 
 29. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376 (citing Staver, supra note 8, at 1102). 
 30. Scott Michael Rank, What Is Federalism?, HISTORY ON NET, 
https://www.historyonthenet.com/what-is-federalism [https://perma.cc/9VAJ-K8BU]. 
 31. Birdsong, supra note 24, at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 28, 
at 306). Some situations in which Younger abstention is required to prevent a federal court from 
improperly intruding on a state’s rights include civil actions, state criminal proceedings, and 
administrative actions. See Brown, supra note 18, at 119–20. 
 32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. Id. at 43. 
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functions”;35 and a “belief that the National Government will fare best if the 
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in 
their separate ways.”36 The Court referred to these concerns as “Our 
Federalism” and noted that “Our Federalism . . . occupies a highly important 
place in our Nation’s history and its future.”37  
Younger abstention has been expanded and curtailed numerous times by 
the Court,38 but it has always maintained its original purpose: ensuring that 
federal courts respect the boundaries of our federal republic and do not usurp 
states’ rights. These federalism concerns can be said to underlie each type of 
abstention, but Younger is perhaps the most consequential as it is the most 
widely applied.39 
A. The O’Shea “Subcategory” of Younger Abstention 
Given the relative frequency with which Younger has been applied, and 
therefore expanded,40 it is no surprise that the doctrine has become rather 
amorphous. One such expansion arguably occurred in O’Shea v. Littleton,41 when 
the Supreme Court addressed Younger abstention despite dismissing the case on 
other grounds.42 In O’Shea, residents of Illinois sued two state court judges who 
had allegedly engaged in a “pattern and practice of conduct . . . which assertedly 
deprived [the residents] . . . of their rights under the Constitution.”43 The state 
residents sought injunctive relief in federal court, hoping the district court 
would enjoin the state judges from engaging in unconstitutional bond setting, 
issuing discriminatory criminal sentences, and requiring payments for jury 
trials.44 The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the 
complaint did not allege an “actual case or controversy.”45 However, after 
 
 35. Id. at 44. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 44–45. 
 38. See generally Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) 
(holding that Younger abstention can be appropriate in quasi-judicial state administrative proceedings); 
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (dropping the requirement that the state is a party in the litigation); 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (applying Younger to state civil proceedings); Samuels 
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (expanding Younger to federal declaratory relief). 
 39. See Brown, supra note 18, at 115 (citing Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional 
Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 336 (1989) (stating that 
Younger is the broadest of the abstention theories)).  
 40. David Mason, Note, Slogan or Substance? Understanding “Our Federalism” and Younger 
Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 852, 871–76 (1988). 
 41. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). As this Recent Development will argue, O’Shea was not intended to be 
and is not currently an illustrative application of Younger and should not be considered by lower courts 
when applying Younger. See infra Part II. 
 42. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 489. 
 43. Id. at 488. 
 44. Id. at 492. 
 45. Id. at 493. 
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spending significant time explaining the plaintiffs’ lack of standing46 (and thus 
a lack of jurisdiction), the Court went on to discuss why the Younger abstention 
doctrine would compel dismissal of the complaint even if the standing 
requirements were met.47 
O’Shea’s discussion of Younger abstention was a direct reproach to the lower 
court’s decision that equitable relief would be appropriate, noting that the order 
the district court would have imposed would have likely interfered with the 
state proceedings.48 The Court was unequivocal in stating that “[t]his seems to 
us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state . . . proceedings which 
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . 
and related cases sought to prevent.”49 While the Court’s condemnation of an 
injunction requiring “continuous supervision by the federal court” and 
“monitoring of the operation of state court functions”50 was incredibly clear, the 
precedential value of this discussion is less so. 
Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence that, while he agreed with the 
majority’s finding that the plaintiffs had failed the standing requirement, the 
“additional discussion” of whether Younger abstention was appropriate was 
nothing more than an “advisory opinion that [the Court was] powerless to 
render.”51 In a word, the Court’s discussion regarding Younger abstention and its 
underlying principles was merely dicta.52 Despite the clear nonbinding effect of 
the abstention discussion, the Ninth Circuit’s Planet decision failed to 
sufficiently consider federalism and comity and instead expanded Younger 
abstention by incorrectly giving O’Shea binding precedential consideration.53 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Younger Abstention 
In Planet, the Ninth Circuit overturned the Central District of California’s 
decision54 to abstain under Younger from hearing the merits of a case challenging 
the constitutionality of a state court’s filing procedures.55 CNS, a news agency 
 
 46. See id. at 493–99. 
 47. Id. at 499–504. 
 48. See id. at 500. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 501. Notably, the Court specifically highlighted the principle of comity in its discussion. 
Id. 
 51. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 52. Dicta is “an opinion by a court on a question that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by 
counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential to the decision and therefore not 
binding even if it may later be accorded some weight.” Judicial Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). 
 53. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 789–792 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 54. The district court, and thus the Ninth Circuit, technically abstained under O’Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488 (1974), which, according to the Ninth Circuit, is an extension of Younger, see Planet, 750 
F.3d at 789. 
 55. See Planet, 750 F.3d at 779. 
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that reviews court complaints and reports of civil lawsuits,56 covers courthouses 
all over the country.57 Beginning in 2010, it began reporting daily on the lawsuits 
filed in Ventura County Superior Court for the State of California.58 The court, 
however, withheld complaints until they were fully processed by the clerk’s 
office, effectively preventing CNS reporters from accessing newly filed 
complaints without delay.59 CNS filed its lawsuit in federal district court 
seeking injunctive relief to require the Ventura County Superior Court to 
ensure immediate or near-immediate access to complaints.60 CNS’s claim was 
based on the theory that withholding the complaint “violate[d] [CNS’s] right 
of access . . . under the First Amendment.”61 The district court dismissed on the 
basis of Younger abstention,62 but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.63 
After de novo review, the Ninth Circuit found the district court had 
improperly abstained under Younger. In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit erroneously used O’Shea as a conduit for its analysis.64 Looking to its 
own prior interpretation of “O’Shea abstention,” the Ninth Circuit incorrectly 
ignored the importance of comity and federalism in a Younger analysis, and 
instead created a relatively bright-line rule: “O’Shea abstention is inappropriate 
where the requested relief may be achieved without an ongoing intrusion into 
the state’s administration of justice, but is appropriate where the relief sought 
would require the federal court to monitor the substance of individual cases on 
an ongoing basis to administer its judgment.”65 
With the creation of the “O’Shea abstention” rule, the court reasoned that 
the plaintiff’s requested relief—an injunction preventing the defendant from 
maintaining filing procedures that resulted in delayed access to newly filed civil 
complaints—would not require an “ongoing federal audit” of the state court.66 
The federal court suggested various procedures the state court could adopt to 
ensure compliance with a federal order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff, 
such as keeping preprocessed complaints in a locked room and giving a key to 
 
 56. Id. at 780. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 781. 
 59. See id. at 781–82. Specifically, the court limited reports to “viewing twenty-five complaints 
each day” and withheld complaints until they had been fully processed. Id. at 781. In one instance, one 
CNS reporter was prevented from accessing civil complaints for up to thirty-four days. Id. at 782. 
 60. See id. at 779. CNS took issue with the state court’s withholding of complaints for “days or 
weeks,” depending on the processing time. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, No. CV11-08083 R (MANx), 2011 WL 11715054, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011), rev’d, 750 F.3d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 63. Planet, 750 F.3d at 779. 
 64. Id. at 789. 
 65. Id. at 790. This rule was developed by reading two prior Ninth Circuit cases in tandem. See 
E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2012); L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 
697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 66. See Planet, 750 F.3d at 790–91. 
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CNS reporters or allowing the reporters to view cover pages of complaints and 
request further access to newsworthy cases, neither of which would require an 
ongoing federal audit.67 
However, the court casually dismissed the realistic concerns that the state 
court would not sufficiently comply with a federal injunction and simply noted 
that it “trust[ed]” the state court.68 The Ninth Circuit asserted that further 
federal proceedings to ensure compliance—an ongoing federal audit, of sorts—
would be unlikely.69 The court concluded its opinion by noting that the “First 
Amendment issues . . . may be adjudicated . . . in federal court, where they 
belong.”70 Notably absent from the Planet decision, however, was any substantial 
discussion of the principles underlying Younger or “O’Shea abstention.”71 The 
Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider comity and federalism betrays its underlying 
belief that state courts are less fit to adjudicate First Amendment claims than 
are the federal courts—a belief which is squarely at odds with Younger and the 
concept of “Our Federalism”: 
[Our Federalism] represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity 
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and 
in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to 
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States.72  
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Application of Younger Abstention 
In Brown, the Seventh Circuit was presented with a situation similar to 
that in Planet, albeit with an opposite procedural posture. The court reversed 
the district court’s refusal to abstain from hearing the merits of a challenge to 
an Illinois state court’s filing procedures.73 CNS had brought suit against the 
Cook County Clerk’s Office (“Clerk’s Office”) contesting filing procedures that 
led to delays in CNS reporters’ access to newly filed civil complaints.74 From 
2009 to 2015, the Clerk’s Office filing procedures allowed same-day access to 
electronically filed complaints, but in 2015, the Clerk’s Office began 
 
 67. See id. at 791 (explaining that the state court could give CNS reporters a “key to a room where 
new complaints are placed in boxes for review . . . [or] place paper versions of new complaints in a 
secure area behind the counter . . . [or] allow a credentialed reporter . . . to go behind the counter and 
pick up a stack of papers that already exists”). 
 68. Id. at 792. 
 69. See id. at 791–92. 
 70. Id. at 793. 
 71. See infra Part II. 
 72. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
 73. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No. 
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019). 
 74. See id. at 1066. 
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withholding the electronically filed complaints from both reporters and the 
public until they were fully processed and officially accepted by the court.75 The 
new administrative process led to delays in access of usually no more than one 
business day.76 
In 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court mandated electronic filing of all 
complaints in Illinois state courts, presumably leading to delays in access to 
newly filed complaints in all civil cases.77 In anticipation of these delays, CNS 
attempted to negotiate with the Clerk’s Office in hopes of coming to a mutually 
beneficial arrangement that would allow for more immediate access to 
electronically filed complaints.78 However, CNS was unsuccessful: the filing 
procedures remained the same, and CNS sued in federal district court.79 As in 
the Planet decision, CNS’s claim in Brown was premised on violations of the 
public’s right of access to judicial proceedings under the First Amendment.80 
However, unlike in Planet, the district court refused to abstain under Younger, 
and the Seventh Circuit reversed.81 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to abstain under Younger was “ultimately 
base[d] . . . on the more general principles of federalism that underlie all of the 
abstention doctrines.”82 The court acknowledged that Younger abstention did 
not neatly align with the facts at issue in the case at bar,83 but that the O’Shea 
extension of the Younger doctrine compelled abstention.84 The Seventh Circuit 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. Prior to this mandate, complaints filed in hard copy format were presumably accessible 
the same day they were filed. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1066–67. 
 80. Id. at 1065. 
 81. Id. at 1066. 
 82. Id. at 1071; see supra text accompanying note 29; see also Staver, supra note 8, at 1102 (noting 
that the purpose of the abstention doctrines is to preserve the balance between federal and state 
sovereignty). The general principles of federalism and comity were ultimately the impetus for the 
various iterations of abstention—different cases and situations demanded different levels of respect for 
state interests over federal interests and vice versa. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376. Furthermore, 
the Seventh Circuit pointed to the state courts’ need to “work[] through . . . implementation challenges 
and resource limitations” associated with altering their complaint filing procedures. Brown, 908 F.3d 
at 1074. The court also noted that federal oversight would be required if the state court clerk did not 
comply with a federal injunction as additional justification for abstaining. See id.; cf. Courthouse News 
Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) (failing to consider similar implementation challenges 
and resource limitations that the state court may need to work through). 
 83. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072. Younger abstention has traditionally been found to be appropriate 
only in cases where there is a pending state proceeding. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 
705 (1992) (“Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts 
of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.”). In Brown, no state proceeding had been initiated. See 
Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072. 
 84. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072–73. The court also discussed an extension of Younger and its 
underlying principles. Id. at 1073 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976)). However, as 
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highlighted that the O’Shea Court relied on the principles underlying the 
Younger doctrine when it noted in dicta that the federal judiciary should abstain 
in situations where an injunction would require an “ongoing federal audit,” 
which would be inconsistent with notions of federalism and comity.85 
The Seventh Circuit noted abstention was warranted because the relief 
sought by CNS was “simply too high” a level of intrusion into state court 
operations—Younger compelled “the assumption that state courts are co-equal 
to the federal courts and are fully capable of respecting and protecting CNS’s 
substantial First Amendment rights.”86 It was the Seventh Circuit’s accurate 
understanding that “cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict” 
most effectively further the “federal design” envisioned by the Framers.87 The 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged its conclusion directly contradicted that of the 
Ninth Circuit88: 
[W]e respectfully disagree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit. If 
the state court clerk refuses or fails to comply with the federal court’s 
injunction or complies only partially, the federal court’s involvement 
would certainly continue as it oversees the implementation of its order. 
Further, we have no doubt CNS would attempt to use a different 
decision in this case to force the hand of other state courts that do not 
provide immediate press access to court filings. This would likely lead to 
subsequent litigation in the federal courts. We want to avoid a situation 
in which the federal courts are dictating in the first instance how state 
court clerks manage their filing procedures and the timing of press 
access. We also want to avoid the problems that federal oversight and 
intrusion of this sort might cause.89 
The court thus assessed the realistic implication that a federal injunction against 
a state court could create an ongoing federal audit and correctly decided that 
such an injunction “would run contrary to the considerations of equity, comity, 
 
this case is not at issue in Planet, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of Rizzo will not be discussed in this 
Recent Development.  
 85. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974)). 
 86. Id. at 1074. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits seem to have differing opinions on the capabilities of state 
courts to understand and apply federal law. Given this difference, it is perhaps more understandable 
why the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the underlying principles of the Younger abstention doctrine; 
indeed, there is only a single reference to notions of comity in the Planet decision. See Courthouse 
News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 89. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1074–75. The Seventh Circuit further noted that, because its decision 
would create a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, it circulated the opinion to all judges in active 
service. Id. at 1075 n.6. None requested to rehear the case en banc. Id. 
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and federalism,”90 and “unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the 
States.”91  
II.  WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planet that abstention was improper 
illustrates an incorrect application of the Younger doctrine. Both the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits relied heavily on O’Shea in their analyses; however, only the 
Seventh Circuit characterized O’Shea’s discussion of Younger abstention as 
simply an “extension” of the principles underlying Younger abstention.92 While 
the Seventh Circuit properly used the abstention dicta in O’Shea as an 
influential, nonbinding93 guide, and focused instead on the core principles of 
the Younger doctrine, the Ninth Circuit treated O’Shea as binding precedent, 
thus completely disregarding the original purposes for the abstention doctrines. 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit regarded O’Shea as standing solely for the 
proposition that abstention is mandatory when “the plaintiff seeks an ‘ongoing 
federal audit’ of the state judiciary, whether in criminal proceedings or in other 
respects.”94 This misses the point of O’Shea in two respects: first, the Ninth 
Circuit entirely ignored that the primary issue in O’Shea was the plaintiff’s lack 
of standing and that the abstention discussion was merely dicta;95 and second, 
the court ignored O’Shea’s insistence that “monitoring . . . state court functions 
[would be] antipathetic to established principles of comity.”96 The Ninth 
Circuit’s handling of O’Shea stands in contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s 
treatment where the court acknowledged, albeit briefly, that O’Shea’s holding 
rested on a lack of standing, not Younger abstention; yet, the Seventh Circuit 
nonetheless acknowledged that the O’Shea Court’s treatment of Younger 
required an analysis of comity and federalism.97 By briefly highlighting the 
actual holding of O’Shea and acknowledging O’Shea’s discussion of comity and 
 
 90. Id. at 1075. 
 91. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). 
 92. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072. 
 93. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 94. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting E.T. v. Cantil-
Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 95. See supra notes 46–47, 52 and accompanying text. Moreover, numerous law review articles 
extensively discuss Younger abstention and none treat O’Shea as an extension or subset of Younger. See, 
e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1049, 1084–92 (1994). See generally Beth Shankle Anderson, “Our Federalism” The Younger 
Abstention Doctrine and Its Companions, 81 FLA. B.J. 9–10, 12, 14 (2007) (explaining the Younger doctrine 
and its major expansions and curtailments, none of which include O’Shea). 
 96. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974). 
 97. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No. 
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) (“The Supreme Court [in O’Shea] . . . reversed this 
court, finding that the claims were not ripe because there was an insufficient probability that the 
plaintiffs would be brought before the . . . courts again on criminal charges.”). 
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federalism, the Seventh Circuit properly contextualized O’Shea’s abstention 
discussion as dicta, which is intended to be “influential,” but “[has] no direct 
precedential weight.”98 Because the Seventh Circuit treated O’Shea as 
influential rather than binding, it retains a level of flexibility unavailable to the 
Ninth Circuit as a result of treating O’Shea as a bright-line rule that incorrectly 
ignores consideration of comity and federalism.99 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, some lower courts treat “all considered 
statements” by a higher court, dicta or otherwise, as binding.100 As such, it can 
be fairly argued that the Ninth Circuit treated O’Shea’s abstention dicta as 
binding in a prudent move to avoid being overruled.101 Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit subsequently relied on O’Shea in holding that abstention was proper in 
Miles v. Wesley.102 There, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a group of 
plaintiffs who sued in federal court seeking an injunction to prevent the Los 
Angeles County Superior Court from consolidating tenant eviction actions into 
“hub courts.”103 The consolidation plan was part of a larger restructuring of the 
state court system due to budget cuts, and the plaintiffs argued that the 
consolidation plan would “disproportionately impact[] poor, disabled, and 
minority residents” under a variety of statutes and constitutional provisions.104 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim 
on the basis of “O’Shea abstention,” reasoning that the plaintiffs’ requested 
injunction would require the type of “‘heavy federal interference in . . . state 
activities . . .’ that Younger and O’Shea sought to prevent.”105 In conclusion, the 
court again framed O’Shea in terms of binding precedent, which ignored comity 
and federalism, rather than influential dicta, noting that “[t]he district court 
properly abstained under O’Shea.”106 
 
 98. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994). 
 99. Notably, the Younger abstention doctrine was born out “of the flexible resources of equitable 
discretion.” See Rehnquist, supra note 95, at 1109 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971); 
and then citing R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)). This suggests that Younger 
was not intended to serve as a rigid framework for lower courts to follow. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has expressed this sentiment. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (“The various 
types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, 
they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that 
contemplates parallel judicial processes.”). 
 100. Dorf, supra note 98, at 2026. 
 101. See id. Beyond simply embarrassing a lower court in its incorrect application of the law, 
overruling a decision by a lower court has important legal implications, particularly regarding 
retroactive application of legal rules imposed by a higher court. For a description of the legal 
implications for parties involved in a controversy where a decision is overruled, see generally James A. 
Spruill, Jr., The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C. L. REV. 199 (1940).  
 102. 801 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 103. Id. at 1061 (defining hub courts as “specialized courts that hear only one type of case”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 1064 (quoting L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 106. Id. at 1066. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s recommitment to O’Shea as a standalone abstention 
doctrine in Miles suggests that the court was indeed treating the abstention dicta 
in O’Shea as binding insofar as it indicated what the Supreme Court would have 
done if presented with the abstention issue under the same facts as O’Shea.107 
However, the facts in Miles are very similar to those in Planet108—thus, the 
effectiveness of utilizing “O’Shea abstention” should be called into question 
because of the differing results in each case.109 
The anomalous result—an intra-circuit split—in the Ninth Circuit 
demands the question: What happened? Although the Ninth Circuit incorrectly 
applied O’Shea instead of Younger in both Miles and Planet, the Miles court’s 
correct decision to abstain suggests the Ninth Circuit does understand that 
Younger abstention—or any derivation therefrom—requires a flexible, but 
intentional, analysis of comity and federalism.110 Such analysis mandates a 
federal court to use its discretion to determine if the particular controversy 
demands restraint from interfering in legitimate state interests.111 A flexible and 
intentional analysis is impossible with the rigid rule taken from O’Shea112 and 
used in Planet, which allows courts to base their abstention decision on whether 
or not they can come up with a set of procedures that would not, in the court’s 
opinion, require an ongoing federal audit. 
Thus, the problem with the inconsistent application in Miles and Planet 
results in a predicament for lower courts in the circuit: When considering 
Younger abstention, does the analysis require application of the more relative 
bright-line rule that ignores comity and federalism as applied in Planet or 
application of the flexible concepts of comity and federalism? To answer this 
question, lower courts in the Ninth Circuit—and perhaps the Ninth Circuit 
itself—should look to the heart of Younger abstention, as illustrated by Supreme 
Court precedent,113 or to the Seventh Circuit’s thorough analysis of comity and 
 
 107. See Dorf, supra note 98, at 2026 (noting that a lower court can reasonably “view the higher 
court’s dicta as a fairly reliable prediction of what the higher court would do if it actually had to decide 
the question previously addressed only in dictum”). 
 108. Both cases concern a plaintiff who is suing a state court defendant for violations of 
constitutional protections in hopes of achieving a federal injunction mandating the actions of a state 
judiciary’s administrative procedures and allocation of its resources. Compare Miles, 801 F.3d at 1060, 
with Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 109. In Miles, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to abstain under Younger and 
O’Shea. See Miles, 801 F.3d at 1061. In Planet, the Ninth Circuit reversed, abstaining under Younger and 
O’Shea. Planet, 750 F.3d at 779. 
 110. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87. “This analysis . . . must outweigh federal 
adjudications.” Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376; see supra text accompanying notes 105–06. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 94. 
 113. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) 
(explaining that the Court’s decision in Younger rested on the “‘more vital consideration’ of comity” 
(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))). Some commentators have noted that “[t]he idea 
that contemporary Younger abstention is based on anything other than abstract notions of comity or 
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federalism, which easily conforms to what the Supreme Court envisioned when 
it established Younger abstention.114 
III.  THE FUTURE OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM IN THE NINTH AND 
SEVENTH CIRCUITS 
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider notions of federalism and comity 
in Planet undermines the purposes the Supreme Court sought to achieve in 
developing Younger abstention, particularly when contrasted with the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision, which sought to further effectuate those notions in the 
Seventh Circuit. This circuit split will likely create unclear boundaries between 
state courts’ power and federal courts’ ability to address state interests even 
when premised on questions of federal law. It is not difficult to envision a 
situation in which tension, conflict, and competition will arise between a state 
and its federal counterpart if notions of federalism and comity are abandoned. 
Indeed, it is precisely this fear that lead the Supreme Court to develop 
abstention in the first place.115 In Younger, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of “a proper respect for state functions” and recognized “that the 
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments.”116 
Subsequently, in Brown, the Seventh Circuit relied on its own precedent in 
highlighting the importance of comity and federalism in a Younger analysis,117 
indicating that comity and federalism are firmly embedded in the Seventh 
Circuit’s Younger jurisprudence. 
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, dismissed comity and federalism 
when it failed to abstain and concluded its opinion by noting that First 
Amendment claims belong in federal court, revealing its failure to give proper 
respect to state functions.118 Where the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
arguments against applying Younger abstention, and thus sought to use O’Shea 
as influential,119 the Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of the arguments in favor of 
abstention and turned to an erroneous bright-line rule.120 Further, in a 
 
federalism should be rejected.” Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical 
Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 8 (2011). 
 114. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 382 (stating comity and federalism lay “at the heart” of the 
Younger decision). 
 115. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 117. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No. 
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) (explaining the “importan[ce] for federal courts to 
have ‘a proper respect for state functions’” (quoting SKS & Assocs., Inc., v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 678 
(7th Cir. 2010))).  
 118. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072 (“The situation here is not a traditional Younger scenario: there 
is no individual, ongoing state proceeding that plaintiffs seek to enjoin.”). 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65, 94. 
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subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit did emphasize comity and federalism,121 thus 
creating an intra-circuit split. As such, it is unclear as to whether comity and 
federalism have a part to play in the Ninth Circuit’s Younger jurisprudence at 
all.122 
CONCLUSION 
“No matter what goals one thinks abstention should achieve, the lower 
courts’ ability to fulfill those objectives can work only as long as they understand 
when to abstain and when not to abstain from hearing a case.”123 The differences 
between the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brown and the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Planet serve as a perfect example of the growing inability of the 
federal judiciary to fulfill the goals of Younger abstention. The tension created 
by two circuits applying the same law—or rather, applying the same nonbinding 
dicta in O’Shea—indicates the amount of confusion at play with respect to 
Younger abstention. While the Seventh Circuit’s application of O’Shea furthers 
the goals of the doctrine and has created a flexible framework through which 
the circuit may analyze any Younger abstention case, the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the same case has created a more rigid rule that has led to 
conflicts within its own circuit and an inability to effectively maintain notions 
of comity and federalism. Brown was the only case of the two submitted to the 
Supreme Court for review and certiorari was denied on October 15, 2019.124 
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision to abstain in Brown stands. The 
Supreme Court may have felt that the split between the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits was not sufficiently problematic to warrant review; however, the 
Court’s denial of certiorari implies that the Seventh Circuit was indeed correct 
in framing comity and federalism as the guiding principles of Younger abstention 
and that “O’Shea abstention” is not a proper extension of Younger. Nevertheless, 
the circuit split—and the lack of clarity as to the necessity of comity and 
federalism in a Younger analysis—remains. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
should take its next opportunity to establish firmly that Younger abstention 
requires a thorough analysis of comity and federalism, thus reinforcing the 
principled underpinnings of our federal republic. 
 
 121. See Miles v. Wesley, 801 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have stated that generally, 
when ‘principles of federalism, comity, and institutional competence’ are implicated, a federal court 
‘should be very reluctant to grant relief . . . .’” (quoting L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 
(9th Cir. 1992))).  
 122. See supra Part III. 
 123. Bedell, supra note 5, at 959. 
 124. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, No. 18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) 
(mem.), denying cert to 908 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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